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A HARD PILL TO SWALLOW: SYMPTOMS AND PROGNOSIS OF 
THE DRUG MANUFACTURER PREEMPTION DEFENSE IN 2018 
 
Brandon Stephens*  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Hatch-Waxman Act1 (HWA) was enacted to facilitate 
rapid availability of affordable generic drugs to the public by sparing 
manufacturers the cost and risk associated with a protracted 
application process.2  While the HWA has certainly proliferated 
generic drug availability, an externality arising from interpretative 
caselaw has had the unintended consequence of absolving generic 
manufacturers from tort liability.3  Plaintiffs injured by generic drugs 
have found it exceedingly difficult to recover for their injuries in 
recent years due to interpretative caselaw concerning manufacturer 
preemption doctrine.4  A new branch of preemption defense even 
emerged around 2016 which extends manufacturer preemption 
protection to brand-name manufacturers.5  This note explores the 
progeny of the pharmaceutical manufacturer preemption defense, its 
origination from the U.S. Supreme Court’s application of the Hatch-
Waxman Act’s provisions, and a prediction about the preemption 
doctrine’s direction in light of recent cases and the Trump 
administration.  It argues that the Supreme Court erroneously 
deferred to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on issues of 
 
*J.D., Touro Law Center, 2018. Brandon Stephens is a graduate of the two-year accelerated 
program. He would like to thank Professor Rena Seplowitz, Law Review Managing Editor 
Luann Dallojacono, and Law Review Editor-in-Chief Michael J. Borger for their assistance 
with this note. 
1 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981, 98 Pub. L. No. 417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
2 See infra Part II. 
3 See infra Part III. 
4 See infra Part IV. 
5 See infra Part V. A. 
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preemption and interpretation of law, and that the FDA acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying generics the ability to 
unilaterally change their labels.  Lastly, this note concludes with an 
argument that all manufacturers should be subject to the same duty to 
strengthen labels and liability for defective designs. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND ITS 
EFFECTS 
The Hatch-Waxman Act6 amended the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in 1984 to expedite patient access to 
affordable generic drugs by making them available upon the 
expiration of brand-name patents.7  Generic manufacturers can 
“essentially piggy-back on a pioneer drug’s human clinical trials and 
labeling”8 by filing an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) 
with the FDA.9  The ANDA process spares generic manufacturers 
from performing redundant and considerably expensive clinical trials 
required of new drug applications (NDA).10  The intent of Congress 
was to incentivize rapid entry into the generic market and to drive 
prices down with competition.11  Generics are identical to brand-
name drugs except for substituted binders and fillers; ANDAs require 
that a generic drug precisely matches its brand-name referent in 
active ingredients, dosage form, route of administration, 
bioequivalence, and label indications.12  Inactive ingredients added to 
generics (such as fillers and binders) can create minor variability but 
are essentially identical.13  In this respect, the HWA has been 
enormously successful in achieving patient access to affordable 
generic drugs.  
However, discovery of latent health effects of drugs can take 
years or even decades to become apparent.  These revelations can 
 
6 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1981, 98 Pub. L. No. 417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
7 SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare v. Watson Pharms., 211 F.3d 21, 26 (2d Cir. 
2000). 




12 SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare v. Watson Pharms., 211 F.3d 21, 26 (2d 
Cir. 2000). 
13 What are Generic Drugs and Are They Safe?, CONSUMER REPORTS (Published: Aug. 
2012), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2012/08/are-generic-drugs-safe/index.html. 
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occur long after a brand-name manufacturer has exited the market.  
However, only brand-name manufacturers are permitted to update 
label precautions according to FDA rules and doctrine.14  Such 
unilateral changes must be accompanied by a “changes being 
effected” (CBE) submission to the FDA detailing the changes.15  
Generic manufacturers, on the other hand, are not permitted to make 
unilateral label changes without prior authorization, according to the 
FDA’s interpretation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) 
as affirmed by the Supreme Court,16 although generics are similarly 
obligated to report adverse events.17  Therefore, no meaningful 
incentive exists for generic manufacturers to petition the FDA to 
permit stronger labels, and following a brand-name manufacturer’s 
departure from the market, there is no one piloting the amendment 
process towards safer destinations.   
Between 2004 and 2018, 8,068,279 reports of adverse side 
effects were submitted to the FDA.18  Generics now constitute eighty-
eight percent of the United States pharmaceutical market;19 therefore, 
it is reasonable to assume that generics are a significant contributor to 
adverse events based on their overall market share.  In spite of this 
alarming trend, both brand-name and generic drug manufacturers are 
effectively immune from state torts such as failure-to-warn and 
defective design claims.20  Provided that manufacturers have 
complied with FDA rules enacted pursuant to federal law, tort claims 
challenging label or design sufficiency are preempted.21  
III. GENESIS OF GENERIC DRUG MANUFACTURER PREEMPTION 
DEFENSE AND ITS FLAWS 
In the first case in which the Supreme Court considered 
pharmaceutical preemption, it concluded that Congress did not intend 
 
14 See infra Part III. B. 
15 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 568 (2009). 
16 PLIVA v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 614-15 (2011). 
17 Id. at 630-33 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
18 Who Reports Adverse Events?, U.S FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, 
https://open.fda.gov/drug/event/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2018). 
19 The Generic Drug Approval Process, U.S FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/NewsEvents/ucm508150.htm, (page last updated: 11/28/2017). 
20 See infra Part III. 
21 See infra Part III. 
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the FDCA to preempt state tort law.22  It also determined that 
impossibility preemption is a demanding affirmative defense that 
shifts the burden to the defendant to demonstrate impossibility 
through clear evidence.23  However, the two subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions concerning manufacturer preemption in the context 
of generics eroded consumer protection by imposing impossibility 
preemption.24  At present, generic manufacturers owe consumers no 
ostensible tort duties.25  In both of the most recent manufacturer 
preemption cases, Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, saying that 
precedent has been ignored and lamenting about the policy 
ramifications.26  
A. Clear Evidence Of Impossibility Originally 
Required For Preemption Defense  
The first in the trilogy of formative drug manufacturer 
preemption defense cases, Wyeth v. Levine,27 was a 6-3 decision and 
the most pro-consumer of the three.  The majority of the Supreme 
Court in Levine held that the FDCA preserves tort suits and that 
federal law did not preempt plaintiff’s failure-to-warn claim against 
the brand-name manufacturer because it was possible for the 
manufacturer to comply with both state tort standards and federal 
obligations imposed by FDA rules.28  The plaintiff suffered 
irreversible corrosion from the direct arterial administration of the 
manufacturer’s drug, Phenergan.29  A physician administered the 
drug through a high-risk IV-push method rather than a safer IV-drip, 
which plaintiff alleged was not sufficiently warned of on the label.30  
The drug caused the patient to develop gangrene, resulting in the 
amputation of her arm.31  The FDA had authorized the sale of the 
 
22 See infra Part III. A. 
23 See infra Part III. A. 
24 See infra Parts III. B, C. 
25 See infra Part III. B, C. 
26 See infra Part III. B, C. 
27 555 U.S. 555, 556 (2009) (Stevens delivered the opinion of the court in which Kennedy, 
Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer joined. Justice Alito delivered the dissent in which 
Scalia and Roberts joined.). 
28 Id. at 572-75. 
29 Id. at 559. 
30 Id. at 560. 
31 Id. at 559. 
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injectable drug in 1955,32 and the defendant had been aware of the 
danger of IV-push administration since 1967.33  The Court reasoned 
that the defendant had an affirmative duty under both state and 
federal law to update its labels to reflect recently discovered IV-push 
dangers and that there was no obstacle preemption, stating that “[i]n 
keeping with Congress’ decision not to preempt common-law tort 
suits, it appears that the FDA traditionally regarded state law as a 
complementary form of drug regulation.”34  The Court observed that 
Congress recognizes that tort suits provide a vital role in protecting 
consumers from previously unknown risks.35  Tort suits also 
incentivize product safety and require manufacturers, which have 
superior knowledge, to take responsibility rather than rely on the 
FDA, which is ill equipped to continuously monitor more than 11,000 
approved drugs.36  The Court held that “absent clear evidence that the 
FDA would not have approved a change to Phenergan’s label, we 
will not conclude that it was impossible for Wyeth to comply with 
both federal and state requirements.”37   
In his dissent that would foreshadow cases to come, Justice 
Samuel Alito framed the legal issue as a question of whether a 
Vermont state jury should be empowered to substitute its opinion of 
label adequacy for the considered and expert opinion of the FDA.38  
Justice Alito relied heavily on a previous decision in Geier v. 
American Honda Motor Company39 for the proposition that state tort 
law can never modify an agency’s safety determinations.40  However, 
Geier differed from Levine in an essential respect.  In Geier, the 
plaintiff’s claim that the manufacturer was negligent for failing to 
install an airbag presented a direct obstacle to the options for 
compliance provided in the agency rule, which the agency 
deliberately anticipated to permit a gradual, mixed fleet of passive 
restraints to allow for experimentation with safety standards.41  
Levine was not obstacle preempted because the FDCA’s manifest 
 
32 Levine, 555 U.S. at 561. 
33 Id. at 569.  
34 Id. at 569, 578. 
35 Id. at 579. 
36 Id. 
37 Levine, 555 U.S. at 571. 
38 Id. at 605 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
39 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
40 Levine, 555 U.S. at 621 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
41 Id. at 579, 580. 
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objective was to promote drug manufacturers’ continuous 
responsibility for product safety by leaving state tort suits intact.42  
The FDCA allows pharmaceutical drugs to be sold upon meeting an 
initial threshold of safety, but with the caveat that they are 
succeptible to future charges of misbranding and mandatory label 
changes.43  The FDA rules create a CBE pathway to label 
strengthening that manufacturers are obligated to follow, reinforcing 
the clear federal objective to place the onus on manufacturers to bear 
responsibility for their labels at all times.   
Geier also acknowledged that state tort suits directed at 
specific models of cars that pose unique safety risks may not pose an 
obstacle to a broadly applying agency rule.44  This reasoning as 
applied to Levine suggests that although a label may be sufficient in 
most cases, it might be flawed with respect to particular indications 
or uses in predisposed populations.  Additionally, the potential for 
state torts to present an obstacle to agency rules is far narrower with 
pharmaceuticals because the sufficiency of labels varies with each 
individual case, whereas a tort duty to impose airbags in cars is 
mutual to all manufacturers in that state and therefore supplants the 
broader federal rule.   
B. Failure-to-Warn Preemption Defense for Generic 
Manufacturers 
Before the Supreme Court addressed generic manufacturer 
preemption on writ of certiorari, the Eighth and Fifth Circuits first 
confronted the issue and held that a generic manufacturer cannot 
remain idle when on notice of a drug’s serious adverse effects.45  
Conflict preemption principles provided no help to generics of 
nothing.  The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the generic manufacturer 
defendant did not surmount Levine’s “clear evidence” of 
impossibility requirement because the defendant failed to prove that 
the FDA would have rejected a proposed label change, or that the 
CBE process was foreclosed to them.46  The Eighth Circuit also 
 
42 Id. at 581. 
43 Id. at 570, 571. 
44 Geier, 529 U.S. at 885.  
45 Mensing v. Wyeth, 588 F.3d 603, 608 (8th Cir. 2009); Demahy v. Actavis, 593 F.3d 
428, 449 (5th Cir. 2010). 
46 Mensing, 588 F.3d at 608. 
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quickly dispatched any obstacle preemption challenge by observing 
that Levine determined that tort suits are not an obstacle to the goal of 
the FDCA: “[a]fter Wyeth, we must view with a questioning mind the 
generic defendants’ argument that Congress silently intended to grant 
the manufacturers of most prescription drugs blanket immunity from 
state tort liability when they market inadequately labeled products.”47  
The Fifth Circuit similarly applied Levine’s “clear evidence” 
impossibility preemption standard and discussed “three avenues for 
complying with both state and federal law: the CBE process, the prior 
approval process, and letters sent directly to healthcare providers.”48  
The court found no evidence of Congress’s “clear and manifest 
purpose” to preempt, recognizing the historical context of the FDCA 
disfavoring preemption and Congress’s omission of a preemption 
provision.49  The Fifth Circuit further explained that Congress could 
not have implicitly intended to have a wanton rule which allowed 
brand-name consumers to recover for injuries but provided no 
remedy to generic consumers.50 
In a decision that surely astonished both the circuit courts and 
plaintiffs, the Supreme Court in PLIVA v. Mensing51 narrowed 
Levine’s preemption exemption to brand-name manufacturers.52  In 
other words, the Court decided that generic manufacturers cannot be 
subjected to failure-to-warn claims and extended a significant 
immunity.  In so doing, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits.53  PLIVA was a 5-4 decision, with Justice Alito 
joining the majority in holding that product liability claims against 
generic manufacturers are preempted, even when the manufacturer 
has notice of severe health risks and has neglected to act.54  The 
Court unquestioningly deferred to the FDA’s interpretation that an 
original manufacturer has a duty to maintain the “adequacy” of label 
warnings through the CBE process while a generic company has no 
such affirmative obligations.55  Under this premise, the Court held 
 
47 Id. at 607. 
48 Demahy, 593 F.3d at 445, 446. 
49 Id. at 435, 448, 449. 
50 Demahy, 593 F.3d at 449. 
51 PLIVA v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 604 (2011).  
52 Id. at 609, 624. 
53 Id. at 626. 
54 See id. at 625. 
55 See id. at 614, 615. 
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that a generic manufacturer is only “responsible for ensuring that its 
warning label is the same as the brand name’s” at all times.56   
Even though the FDA foreclosed generic use of doctor letters 
and the CBE process, it maintained that label adequacy is the 
responsibility of the manufacturer which is under a constant duty to 
petition the FDA to update labels upon discovery of adverse effects.57  
This would seemingly dispense with the defense that a defendant 
manufacturer’s actions were physically impossible.  Instead, the 
Supreme Court expressed skepticism towards the FDA that such a 
duty existed despite showing deference to the agency regarding 
sameness requirements, and proceeded to conclude that even if the 
duty existed, preemption analysis forbids consideration of scenarios 
that reconcile federal and state law.58  According to the Court’s 
reasoning, the defendant established an impossibility preemption 
defense because in order to strengthen its labels sufficiently to avoid 
state tort liability, it would have needed to consult the FDA; thus 
independent compliance was allegedly “impossible.”59  
PLIVA turned manufacturer preemption defense on its head.  
What began in Levine as an onerous affirmative defense requiring 
“clear and convincing evidence” of physical impossibility instead 
became an automatic and impregnable barrier to tort suit against 
generics.  The Court in PLIVA reconciled Levine by reducing it to a 
brief paragraph at the end of the opinion.60  The Court notably 
glossed over the “clear evidence” burden of pleading a preemption 
defense and gave Levine the narrowest holding that preemption 
exemption depends upon a manufacturer’s “unilateral” ability to 
act.61  The opinion supported this harsh constraint by hyperbole that 
without a categorical rule, the supremacy clause would be rendered 
 
56 PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 613. 
57 Id. at 616. 
58 Id. at 620. 
59 PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 618. 
60 “Wyeth is not to the contrary. In that case, as here, the plaintiff contended that a drug 
manufacturer had breached a state tort-law duty to provide an adequate warning label. The 
Court held that the lawsuit was not pre-empted because it was possible for Wyeth, a brand-
name drug manufacturer, to comply with both state and federal law. Specifically, the CBE 
regulation, 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii), permitted a brand-name drug manufacturer like 
Wyeth ‘to unilaterally strengthen its warning’ without prior FDA approval. Thus, the federal 
regulations applicable to Wyeth allowed the company, of its own volition, to strengthen its 
label in compliance with its state tort duty.” Id. at 624, 625. (internal citations omitted).  
61 Id. 
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“illusory” and “meaningless.”62  Where federal law and state law can 
hypothetically conflict, state law is preempted despite identifiable 
courses of action that could lead to their agreement.  
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor highlighted several flaws in 
the majority’s reasoning.  Sotomayor mentioned that Congress 
omitted a federal remedy from the FDCA precisely because it 
understood that state tort law complements the FDCA and 
accompanying rules, not because it intended to deprive injured 
consumers of a remedy. 63  She explained that public health and 
safety are traditional state “police powers,” and in the absence of an 
express intention by Congress, there is a presumption against 
usurping the states’ historic abilities.64  She pointed out that 
hypothetical impossibility of complying with state and federal law is 
not sufficient to invoke a drastic remedy like preemption; rather, 
conflict must be actual and impossibility literal.65  A defendant 
pleading the affirmative defense bears the burden of showing 
unavoidable conflict resulting in physical impossibility,66 though no 
such showing was made or demanded of defendant in PLIVA.  
Sotomayor also discussed a logical inconsistency in the 
majority’s premise that impossibility preemption in the context of 
failure-to-warn claims turns on whether a manufacturer can 
“unilaterally” act independently of FDA consultation.  She explained 
that brand-name amendments are not truly unilateral either because 
their approval ultimately depends on FDA ratification, just as a 
generic manufacturer’s petition to amend its label can be denied by 
the FDA.67  Sotomayor contended that generic label liability is not a 
novel concept in the record, as generic defendants already have an 
FDA-recognized duty to monitor and report instances of adverse 
reactions and vigilantly propose label changes.68   
Sotomayor is convincing.  The distinction between generic 
and brand-name manufacturers with respect to legal impossibility is 
arbitrary because both manufacturers are empowered to take 
corrective action that ultimately relies on FDA approval.  Simply 
 
62 Id. at 620. 
63 PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 643 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Kagan). 
64 Id. at 637, 638, 641. 
65 PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 626, 627 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. at 634. 
67 Id. at 635, 636. 
68 Id. at 631, 632. 
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because brand-name manufacturers can initiate proposed changes 
does not make their capacity to act more convincingly “possible” 
than generic manufacturers that can, and indeed are obligated to, 
attempt changes.  Liability is the most appropriate enforcement 
mechanism to ensure generic manufacturers are honoring this duty 
because it creates a significant financial motive to be proactive in 
order to avoid costly and embarrassing suits.  
C. Generic Manufacturers Absolved of Liability for 
Selling Defective Products 
In another 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court in Mutual 
Pharmaceutical Company v. Bartlett69 revisited generic manufacturer 
preemption defense in the context of defective-design torts.70  Justice 
Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that generic 
manufacturer preemption extends to design-defect claims since 
generics are under a duty of sameness with respect to both design and 
label.71  The plaintiff ingested generic sulindac for shoulder pain and 
developed “a horrendous disease that caused sixty to sixty-five 
percent of the plaintiff’s skin to either burn off or turn into an open 
wound.  The plaintiff was left severely disfigured and nearly blind.”72  
A toxicologist testified at trial that the manufacturer knew that 
sulindac posed a higher risk of toxic epidermal necrosis and Stevens-
Johnson Syndrome than other available drugs evidenced by incident 
reports to the FDA, and that sulindac had a similar safety profile to 
another NSAID withdrawn from the market for misbranding.73  A 
jury found the drug to be unreasonably dangerous and defective as 
designed under the state’s risk-utility analysis, which included label 
sufficiency among the factors to consider.74  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed and the Supreme Court reversed, finding claim preemption 
because generic manufacturers can neither redesign a drug nor 
 
69 Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
70 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470. 
71 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2474-77. 
72 Guidry v. Janssen Pharms., No. 15-4591 SECTION F, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115447, 
at **32 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2016) (giving a concise and poignant description of Bartlett’s 
facts). 
73 Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 678 F.3d 30, 35 (5th Cir. 2012). 
74 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2476. 
10
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change its label to avoid state liability.75  The Court shirked 
responsibility by blaming Congress for the “tragic circumstances.”76 
In an apparent effort to downplay the obvious breadth and 
considerable harm to consumers, Justice Alito qualified the decision 
with dicta that purported to offer two viable claims.  The first 
potentially viable claim parallels the misbranding statute which 
forbids the sale of a drug that is unreasonably dangerous even when 
used in the manner and dosage ordinarily prescribed.77   
The construction of state law necessary to invoke the 
misbranding statute protection is unclear, because plaintiff effectively 
made this argument by presenting expert testimony that sulindac 
shared a profile of danger similar to other drugs withdrawn from the 
market.  Presumably Alito meant that a state tort claim must 
explicitly adopt the federal misbranding statute as a statutory tort in 
order to avoid preemption, since he refused to recognize market 
withdrawal as an option that overcomes impossibility preemption 
even under circumstances suggestive of misbranding.78  If market 
withdrawal could overcome impossibility preemption, we would see 
prospectively misbranded products removed by manufacturers at an 
earlier stage to reduce liability exposure.  This approach would 
further the HWA’s consumer-oriented purpose.  At present, the 
misbranding statute relies on ex post facto tort suits and FDA action 
for teeth.        
Justice Alito also suggested that a state’s imposition of 
absolute liability rather than strict liability may not be preempted.79  
According to Justice Alito, this avoids impossibility preemption 
because a generic manufacturer would have no “affirmative duties” 
that could conflict with federal obligations.80  However, the Supreme 
Court would undoubtedly deem strict liability state torts to be 
obstacle preempted.  Imposing strict liability on generic companies 
would undermine the generic market and create a far more overt 
obstacle to the HWA than standard tort liability.  Manufacturers 
would have no means of defense and would be subjected to a 
 
75 Id. at 2475. 
76 Id. at 2480 (Alito, J., delivering the opinion of the court) (joined by Justices Roberts, 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas). 
77 Id. at 2477 n.4. 
78 Id. at 2477. 
79 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2473, 2474 n.1. 
80 Id. 
11
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constant barrage of automatic liability that would discourage market 
participation and therefore undermine public access to generics.   
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor reiterated many points from 
her dissent in PLIVA81 while addressing new concerns.  She stated 
that while state tort law only requires a liable manufacturer to 
compensate victims, it imposes no affirmative actions that would 
conflict with federal duties.82  According to Sotomayor, a generic 
manufacturer can avoid liability by voluntarily discontinuing sales in 
the forum, paying damages, or even approaching the FDA.83  She 
took issue with the majority’s conflation of impossibility preemption 
and obstacle preemption in rejecting the stop-selling rationale.84  
Sotomayor argued that impossibility preemption requires a thorough 
evaluation of the pre- and post-market review framework for generics 
and then contrasting them with state obligations, whereas the 
majority purports to invoke impossibility preemption but devotes the 
bulk of its opinion to considering policy and historical contexts 
characteristic of obstacle preemption analysis.85  Sotomayor argued 
that the majority rejected the stop-selling rationale under the bizarre 
and inappropriately considered premise that Congress’s purpose 
when enacting the FDCA was to grant a license to generic 
manufacturers to sell unreasonably dangerous drugs without tort 
liability.86  
Sotomayor pointed out that even under obstacle preemption 
(which was not an issue before the Court), the majority completely 
ignored the savings clause added in the 1962 amendment to the 
FDCA, which called for preemption only when there was a “direct 
and positive” conflict with state law.87  She asserted that the 
majority’s conclusion is even more illogical because manufacturers 
have the resources, responsibility, and greater access to health-related 
information than the FDA, which is incapable of vigilantly 
monitoring thousands of drugs.88  Sotomayor also pointed out that the 
majority deferred to the FDA’s “close call” decision of the 
 
81 See infra Part III. B. 
82 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2487-90. 
83 Id. at 2491. 
84 Id. at 2493-96. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 2484. 
88 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2485. 
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preemptive effect of its own rules, despite the Supreme Court’s 
consistently holding that an agency declaring preemptive effect 
without congressional invitation is entitled to little weight.89  Lastly, 
Sotomayor mentioned the greatest concern about the majority’s 
reasoning is that holding premarket FDA review to have preemptive 
effect would imply that torts against brand-name manufacturers are 
also preempted.90  This turns out to have been an accurate 
prediction.91   
IV. THEORIES OF RECOVERY IN THE AFTERMATH OF GENERIC 
MANUFACTURER TORT PREEMPTION 
Fraud has had some success as a stand-alone recovery theory 
for injured patients post-PLIVA/Bartlett.  Misbranding is also 
emerging as a potential loophole to generic manufacturer preemption, 
but that means that a drug must be unreasonably dangerous for any 
approved purpose, even as prescribed.  Therefore, uniquely 
predisposed populations are without recourse, which defies 
fundamental tort principles like the eggshell plaintiff rule and duty 
assigned by contract.  In general, remedies are inconsistently applied 
and often deprive injured patients of redress.  Courts have generally 
declined to shift responsibility to brand-name manufacturers when a 
plaintiff has only ingested the generic version.  Liability shifting, 
however, is preferable to a complete bar on plaintiff recovery.  
A. Misbranding as a Means of Introducing “Parallel” 
State Claims Against Generics 
As the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois 
pointed out in a 2014 case, Bartlett leads to the ironic and confusing 
implication that a parallel state law requiring a dangerous generic 
drug be taken off the market may actually avoid conflict with federal 
labeling rules, whereas a state tort law indirectly having the same 
effect is preempted by the Hatch-Waxman Act:  
In Bartlett, the Supreme Court expressly noted an 
exception for state-law claims that parallel the federal 
misbranding statute. (“We do not address state design-
 
89 Id. at 2494. 
90 Id. at 2494-95. 
91 See infra Part V.A. 
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defect claims that parallel the federal misbranding 
statute.”). The federal statute requires a manufacturer 
to pull a drug from the market (even though approved 
by the FDA) if it is “dangerous to health” even when 
used in accordance with the FDA-approved directions. 
This exception only applies where the plaintiff’s claim 
is based on scientific information that was not 
available when the FDA approved the drug.92 
Therefore, a narrow exception to generic manufacturer preemption 
exists when a plaintiff can demonstrate that the drug in question is 
misbranded for any approved use based upon information obtained 
post-approval, and state law imposes a similar duty.  The definition 
section of the Hatch-Waxman Act describes some of the criteria to be 
considered in evaluating whether a drug is misbranded; both implied 
and express misrepresentations of material consequences from 
regularly prescribed use are relevant.93  However, the FDCA 
provisions do not provide a private cause of action.  State negligence 
laws modeled on federal misbranding will still be preempted, 
whereas negligence per se claims that integrate misbranding will be 
more likely to survive.94 
B. Courts Should Not Refuse to Shift Generic Failure-
to-Warn Liability to Brand-Name Manufacturers  
The “overwhelming” majority of courts have declined to shift 
liability for generic drug-related injuries to brand-name 
manufacturers under any theory of liability due to either a lack of 
 
92 Gannon v. Bayer Healthcare Pharms., Inc. (In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., 
Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig.), No. 3:13-cv-10143-DRH-PMF, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 56862,  at *31 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2014) (internal citations omitted). 
93 21 U.S.C.S. § 321 (n): “If an article is alleged to be misbranded because the labeling or 
advertising is misleading, then in determining whether the labeling or advertising is 
misleading there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only representations 
made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, or any combination thereof, but also 
the extent to which the labeling or advertising fails to reveal facts material in the light of 
such representations or material with respect to consequences which may result from the use 
of the articles to which the labeling or advertising relates under the conditions of use 
prescribed in the labeling or advertising thereof or under such conditions of use as are 
customary or usual.” 
94 Gwendolyn McKee, Injury Without Relief: The Increasing Reluctance of Courts to 
Allow Negligence Per Se Claims Based On Violations of FDA Regulations, 83 UMKC L. 
REV. 161, 171 (2014). 
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privity or obvious attempts to circumvent preemption.95  An outlier 
case shifted total liability onto the brand-name manufacturer for off-
label use, notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff ingested only the 
generic version.  Christmas came a few days early for plaintiffs on 
December 21, 2017 in T.H. v. Novartis, 96 a case where the California 
high court boldly acknowledged that no other jurisdiction has 
recognized such expansive brand-name duties.97  The court held that 
brand-name manufacturers are liable for failing to amend their labels 
to reflect known risks even when plaintiff only consumed the generic 
version and the defendant has since exited the market.98  In T.H., 
plaintiffs suffered serious and sustained neurological damage while in 
the womb when their mother took a generic drug for the off-label 
purpose of preventing premature labor contractions.99  The court 
reasoned that because only brand-name manufacturers may 
unilaterally add or strengthen warning indications that apply to 
generics, they therefore bear the fault for failing to update labels to 
reflect foreseeable risks known to them and may not avoid liability 
by offloading their business.100  
The court reached the right decision.  Holding brand-name 
manufacturers liable for generic torts is of course not ideal, but given 
the preemption landscape, it is the most nearly fair option.  Brand-
name manufacturers are exclusively responsible for the ongoing 
adequacy of their labels, which affect the labeling requirements of 
generic manufacturers that must conform. Brand-name manufacturers 
ought to bear both the risk as well as the reward for their products. 
By the time generics enter the market, a brand-name manufacturer 
will already have enjoyed exclusive sales bestowed by their patent.  
While holding brand-name manufacturers accountable as a last resort 
might seem unfair, it is significantly worse policy to deprive 
consumers of any tort rights.  Creating a stronger impetus for brand- 
name manufacturers to acknowledge and address safety defects will 
force generic manufacturers to be more proactive in following suit.  
Neglectful generics will appropriately be subjected to tort liability for 
 
95 Germain v. Teva Pharms. USA., 756 F.3d 917, 938-39 (6th Cir. 2014). 
96 407 P.3d 18 (Cal. 2017). 
97 T.H., 407 P.3d at 22, 47. 
98 Id. at 22. 
99 Id. at 23. 
100 Id. at 41, 43. 
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their products, thereby absolving brand-name manufacturers of 
culpability and reinforcing brand-name manufacturers’ vigilance.  
B. Are Generic Manufacturers Liable for Fraudulent 
and Unapproved Off-label Promotion?  
It is estimated that nearly twenty percent of prescriptions are  
for off-label uses and doctors are free to prescribe medications for 
off-label purposes.101  Off-label prescriptions include the use of so-
called “orphan drugs,” or drugs that treat individuals with rare 
conditions but do not have a large enough market to justify 
undergoing the costly FDA approval process.102  According to the 
U.S. General Accounting Office, one-third of cancer drugs are orphan 
drugs, and half of all cancer patients take at least one orphan 
medication.103 
As discussed, an overwhelming majority of courts have held 
that a brand-name drug manufacturer may not be liable under any 
theory of tort liability when the plaintiff was injured by a generic 
counterpart, even in the case of off-label marketing facilitated by the 
brand-name manufacturer.104  However, in Priest v. Sandoz105 the 
District Court of Texas, joining several other district courts, refused 
defendant manufacturer’s defense that off-label promotion claims 
against it were preempted.106  Unfortunately, the court in Sandoz still 
held that plaintiffs insufficiently pled their claims.107  According to 
the court, off-label promotion must meet heightened Rule 9(b) 
pleading standards: “[P]laintiff may have an off-label promotion 
claim if the plaintiff alleges that the manufacturer influenced the 
prescribing physician to prescribe the patient off-label amiodarone or 
if the plaintiff alleges the manufacturer concealed the risks of off-
label use of amiodarone.”108  The rule requires a plaintiff to identify 
the specific instances and content of alleged misrepresentations to 
 
101 David Kwok, Controlling Excessive Off-Label Medicare Drug Costs Through the 
False Claims Act, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 185, 193. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 See supra Part IV. B 
105 No. A-15-CV-00822-LY-ML, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186635 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 
2016). 
106 Priest, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186635, at *18.  
107 Id. at 33-38.  
108 Priest, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186635, at *33-34. 
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their prescribing physician, along with the time, place, contents, and 
responsible parties.109  Although plaintiff’s off-label claim initially 
escaped preemption dismissal, the plaintiff could not identify the 
content or time of allegedly fraudulent statements.110  It is difficult to 
imagine how a plaintiff could have access to these marketing 
materials at the pleading stage without allowing discovery to proceed 
via interrogatories and subpoenas for marketing materials.  If the 
plaintiff had access to these materials, one could argue there would 
be no suit since plaintiff would have already been on notice of the 
dangers.  Despite the viability of off-label fraud claims against 
generics, premature dismissal under stringent pleading standards 
offers plaintiffs little hope.  Plaintiffs are left to rely on the 
cooperation of doctors and the manufacturers themselves to furnish 
materials necessary for developing their case.  
V. THE TRAJECTORY OF MANUFACTURER PREEMPTION 
DOCTRINE 
At present, the trajectory of manufacturer preemption does 
not look hopeful for patients injured by pharmaceutical drugs.  Most 
troubling is that some recent cases have even found preemption 
applicable to brand-name manufacturers.  The FDA failed to consider 
CBE for generic manufacturers as they were slated to do in April 
2017.  The appointments of Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch and 
FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb under the Trump administration 
provide uncertain opportunity for changing manufacturer preemption.  
Dr. Gottlieb has been an opponent of altering generic preemption111 
while Justice Gorsuch seems to disfavor unrestrained agency 
deference.112  This could be crucial because a close reading of the 
FDA rules demonstrates the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously 




110 Id. at 37-38. 
111 Infra Part V.B. 
112 Infra Part V.B. 
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A. District Court Division Over Preempting Design 
Defect Claims Against Brand-Name Manufacturers 
Post-approval-based design-defect theories are preempted 
because changes to an approved brand-name formula are prohibited 
after approval, as are dosage adjustments which require prior FDA 
approval.113  However, district courts have diverged on whether 
defective design torts against brand-name manufacturers premised 
upon a preapproval defective design theory are also preempted.114  In 
Yates v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals, a case about a birth 
control drug, the court relied upon Bartlett’s disavowal of the “stop-
selling rationale” in holding that the plaintiff’s preapproval defective 
design claim against the brand-name manufacturer was preempted.115  
The court reasoned that plaintiff’s argument amounted to a stop-
selling claim because the premise was that the defective birth control 
composition, “Ortho Evra,” was so foreseeably dangerous that it 
should never have been brought to application before the FDA.116  
The court stated that to hold otherwise would call for speculation 
over an alternate formula, its effects, and whether the FDA would 
have approved the proposed formula.117  This rationale is dubious.  
All product liability claims based on defective design entail a 
demonstration of safer alternatives, and it is not too attenuated to 
envision a safer drug’s meeting FDA approval.118  
On the other hand, the district court in Guidry v. Janssen 
Pharmaceuticals119 held that defective design and failure-to-warn 
claims against a brand-name manufacturer are not preempted by 
federal law if the drug’s design (and label based thereon) was 
“unreasonably risky” at the time of application: “The dispositive 
question presented here is simply: Can a drug manufacturer 
independently design a reasonably safe drug in compliance with its 
state-law duties before seeking FDA approval?  The answer is 
yes.”120  This holding is aligned with Levine and common sense.  
 
113 Yates v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharms., 808 F.3d 281, 298 (6th Cir. 2015). 
114 Young v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, No. 4:16-CV-00108-DMB-JMV, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 24730, at *17-22 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 22, 2017). 
115 Yates, 808 F.3d at 300. 
116 See id. 
117 Id. at 299-300. 
118 Young, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24730, at *18-20. 
119 Guidry v. Janssen Pharms., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1187 (E.D. La. 2016). 
120 Id. at 1207-08. 
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Nothing in the FDCA alludes to construing the FDA’s permission to 
sell a new drug as an absolute defense to liability.  Underlying 
generic preemption is a policy to incentivize generic manufacturers to 
rapidly enter the market with a low barrier to entry to compensate for 
enhanced competition.  Brand-name manufacturers, on the other 
hand, are not as vulnerable because they typically enjoy a patent 
monopoly on their product in which to recoup their investment.  
Therefore, the same need for protective preemption defense does not 
exist for brand-name manufacturers.  
B. Trump Administration and Manufacturer 
Preemption Defense 
A proposed amendment to the FDA’s rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 
67985, would enable unilateral label changes to be made by generic 
manufacturers.121  The rule was proposed in 2013 presumably as a 
response to PLIVA and Bartlett, though it has yet to be ratified 
despite an April 2017 consideration deadline.122  The FDA 
supposedly still plans to issue a final rule despite ardent manufacturer 
lobbying against it, but has yet to do so as the proposed rule yields to 
more “immediate priorities.”123  Unfortunately, the rule appears 
destined for the FDA’s proposed rules archive for the foreseeable 
future.  The Trump administration’s FDA Commissioner, Dr. 
Gottlieb, has been an outspoken opponent of any rule that would 
enable unilateral labeling change by manufacturers, believing them to 
endanger access to generic drugs by a proliferation of litigation.124  
Prior to assuming the role of commissioner, he condoned off-label 
advertisement, and since becoming commissioner, he has issued few 
letters of admonishment for such practices.125  Furthermore, Gottlieb 
 
121 Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and 
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67985, 67989 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013). 
122 Erin Bosman, Julie Park, Brittany Scheinok, Trump’s Nominee for FDA Commissioner 
Likely Dooms Generic Drug Labeling Rule, CLASS DISMISSED (March 30, 2017), 
http://classdismissed.mofo.com/product-liability/trumps-nominee-for-fda-commissioner-
likely-dooms-generic-drug-labeling-rule/. 
123 Brownwyn Mixter, FDA’s Generic Drug Labeling Rule Delayed Again, BLOOMBERG 
BNA: HEALTH CARE BLOG (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.bna.com/fdas-generic-drug-
b73014462786/. 
124 See Bosman et. al., Trump’s Nominee.  
125 Sheila Kaplan and Katie Thomas, F.D.A. Chief Goes Against the Administration 
Stereotype, N.Y. TIMES: HEALTH (Feb. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/11/ 
health/gottlieb-fda-drugs.html. 
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has been vocal about making generic drugs more affordable by 
expediting the approval process and has even publicly condemned 
brand-name companies that will not offer generic manufacturers 
samples of their drugs for development.126  While making generics 
more affordable clearly benefits the public, implementing such 
measures without addressing manufacturer preemption will also 
increase the growing number of uncompensated pharmaceutical drug 
victims.  Nevertheless, Gottlieb has acquired a reputation for being 
responsive to both consumer and pharmaceutical interests.127  
However, for that same reason, already proposed policies that harm 
the bottom line of generic manufacturers are unlikely to be followed 
up by a generic CBE rule that exposes manufacturers to tort liability 
as well. 
The trajectory of the manufacturer preemption defense from a 
judicial perspective is more hopeful when considering Justice 
Gorsuch’s skeptical views on agency deference may lead him to 
reject the manufacturer preemption defense.  In a previous opinion, 
Gorsuch asserted that a judicially created doctrine on administrative 
law affords too much power to administrative agencies to interpret 
the law, which is the domain of the court: 
Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies 
to swallow huge amounts of core judicial and 
legislative power and concentrate federal power in a 
way that seems more than a little difficult to square 
with the Constitution of the framers’ design. Maybe 
the time has come to face the behemoth.128 
Still, it is difficult to infer too much about his potential views on 
manufacturer preemption from this observation.  In Caplinger v. 
Medtronic,129 Gorsuch declined to defer to the FDA’s most recent 
position on the preemptive effect of the Medical Device Act’s 
provisions, as the FDA had contradicted an earlier pronouncement on 
the issue.130  Gorsuch would likely be skeptical of the FDA’s 




128 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
129 784 F.3d 1335 (10th Cir. 2015). 
130 Caplinger, 784 F.3d at 1346. 
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the agency has been inconsistent on the subject.131  In fact, the FDA’s 
offered interpretation for disallowing a generic manufacturer to 
unilaterally invoke the CBE process is actually contrary to a close 
reading of its own rule.  The Illinois District Court seemed to 
recognize this back in 2009:  
Although Congress intended for ANDA applicants to 
submit identical labeling to the FDA when seeking 
ANDA approval--see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v)--the 
statute is silent as to the manufacturer’s obligation 
after the ANDA is granted. But 21 C.F.R. § 314.97 is 
not silent--it states that generic drug manufacturers are 
obligated to comply with the same CBE provisions as 
brand-listed manufacturers are.132 
The “sameness requirement” applies to an initial, preapproval ANDA 
application to assure conformity with a drug already presumed to be 
safe.133  The FDA’s own rule on post-approval ANDA changes134 
explicitly incorporates the labeling changes section from which the 
CBE rule derives.135  The FDA therefore violated its own rules 
arbitrarily and capriciously by excluding generics from CBE without 
formal amendment, a consideration overlooked by the Supreme Court 
in deferring to the FDA’s inconsistent views.   
However, a proper interpretation of the FDA rule only defeats 
impossibility preemption, but not necessarily obstacle preemption.  
Caplinger also happens to be the most analogous preemption case 
considered by Gorsuch involving state tort claims against a medical 
device manufacturer for off-label advertising.136  In following 
precedent while interpreting the express preemption provision in the 
Medical Device Act, Gorusch explained that even off-label state tort 
suits impose additional or different safety requirements that trigger 
obstacle preemption.137  Applying this reasoning to manufacturer 
preemption would suggest that Gorsuch would agree with the 
 
131 Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2481-82 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
132 Stacel v. Teva Pharms., 620 F. Supp. 2d 899, 907 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
133 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v). 
134 21 C.F.R. § 314.97(a): “General requirements. The applicant must comply with the 
requirements of §§ 314.70 and 314.71 regarding the submission of supplemental ANDAs 
and other changes to an approved ANDA.” 
135 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii). 
136 Caplinger, 784 F.3d at 1336-37. 
137 Id. at 1345. 
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holdings in PLIVA and Bartlett that state tort suits impose an obstacle 
to federal objectives.  However, Gorsuch took care in Caplinger to 
qualify that the holding was compelled by the express preemption 
provision within the Medical Device Act, and referred to the 
legislative history to support that conclusion.138  In visiting 
manufacturer preemption, Gorsuch would likely give special 
consideration to the relevant savings clause and legislative history 
that support the preservation of state tort suits.139  Therefore, Justice 
Gorsuch’s views seem to offer a possible prospect for overturning 
generic manufacturer preemption if the Court reaches obstacle 
preemption . 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Bartlett and PLIVA should be overruled as contrary to the 
FDCA and the precedent established by the pioneer case, Levine.  In 
the alternative, the Supreme Court should reconsider the deference 
given to the FDA’s inconsistent statements on generic CBE and 
failure to observe its own rules.  If the Supreme Court will not take 
action, the FDA should pass a rule permitting generics to make 
unilateral changes or stating that consultation should not be construed 
as creating impossibility preemption.  Justice Sotomayor pointed out 
many of the failings of generic manufacturer preemption that 
seemingly disregard the FDCA’s savings clause and congressional 
intent to preserve state torts as determined in Levine.140  The result 
has effectually afforded drug manufacturers a license to sell 
dangerous products free from liability.  
The goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to increase consumer 
confidence in generics, promote public health, and create 
uniformity.141  There is no sounder and more sensible way to 
accomplish this than to subject all manufacturers to the same 
expectations, rights, and duties of care.  If inconsistent label 
enhancements are a concern, the FDA can consolidate them and issue 
notices to all manufacturers to compel unanimous adherence.  Non-
compliant manufacturers will be subjected to a prima facie case of 
negligence, thereby enhancing safety while making recovery for 
 
138 Id. at 1346-47. 
139 See supra Part III. A. 
140 See supra Part III. 
141 See supra Part III.A. 
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plaintiffs easier.  As for design defects, there is no meaningful 
difference between other product defect cases and pharmaceutical 
defect cases in particular. In fact, the pervasive use of pharmaceutical 
products should reinforce the need for design scrutiny. Moreover, 
generic manufacturers should share responsibility for defective 
design liability. The notion that generic manufacturers are helpless 
belies the fact that market acquisition is a strategic business decision 
with inherent risks based on available market data and capable of 
hedging and insuring against. 
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